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Abstract
The classical doctrine of the Lender of Last Resort, elaborated by Thornton (1802) and
Bagehot (1873), asserts that the Central Bank should lend to “illiquid but solvent” banks
under certain conditions. Several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete: when
interbank markets are e¢cient, a solvent bank cannot be illiquid. This paper provides a
possible theoretical foundation for rescuing Bagehot’s view. Our theory does not rely on
the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs. We build a model
of banks’ liquidity crises that possesses a unique Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot …nd liquidity assistance in the
market. We derive policy implications about banking regulation (solvency and liquidity
ratios) and interventions of the Lender of Last Resort as well as on the disclosure policy
of the Central Bank.
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1 Introduction
There have been several recent controversies about the need for a Lender of Last Resort
(LLR) both within national banking systems (Central Bank) and at an international level
(IMF).3 The concept of a LLR was elaborated in the XIX century by the governor of the
bank of England, Thornton and by the editor of The Economist, Bagehot. An essential
point of the “classical” doctrine associated to Bagehot asserts that the LLR role is to lend
to “solvent but illiquid” banks under certain conditions.4
Banking crises have been recurrent in most …nancial systems. The LLR facility and
deposit insurance were instituted precisely to provide stability to the banking system and
avoid the consequences for the real sector. Indeed, …nancial distress may cause important
damage to the economy as the example of the Great Depression makes clear (Bernanke
(1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). Traditional banking panics were eliminated
with the LLR facility and deposit insurance by the end of the XIX century in Europe,
after the crisis of the 1930s in the US and also mostly in emerging economies, which have
su¤ered numerous crises until today.5 Modern liquidity crises associated to securitized
money or capital markets have also required the intervention of the LLR. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve intervened in the crises provoked by the failure of Penn Central in the
US commercial paper market in 1970, by the stock market crash of October 1987 and by
Russia’s default in 1997 and subsequent collapse of LTCM (in the latter case a ”lifeboat”
was arranged by the New York Fed). For example, in October 1987 the Federal Reserve
3See for instance Calomiris (1998a,b), Kaufman (1990), Fisher (1998), Mishkin (1998), and Goodhart
and Huang (1999a,b).
4The LLR should lend freely against good collateral, valued at pre-crisis levels, and at a penalty rate.
Bagehot (1873), also presented for instance in Humphrey (1975) and Freixas et al. (1999).
5See Gorton (1988) for US evidence and Lindgren et al (1996) for evidence on IMF member countries.
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supplied liquidity to banks with the discount window.6
The function of the LLR of providing emergency liquidity assistance has been criticized
for provoking moral hazard on the banks’ side. Perhaps more importantly, Goodfriend
and King (1988) (see also Bordo (1990), Kaufman (1991) and Schwartz (1992)) remark
that Bagehot’s doctrine was elaborated at a time where …nancial markets were under-
developed. They argue that, while central banks interventions on aggregate liquidity
(monetary policy) are still warranted, individual interventions (banking policy) are not
anymore: “with sophisticated interbank markets, banking policy has become redundant”.
Open market operations can provide su¢cient liquidity which is then allocated by the
interbank market. The discount window is not needed. In other words, Goodfriend and
King argue that when …nancial markets are e¢cient, a solvent institution cannot be illiq-
uid. Banks can …nance their assets with interbank funds, negotiable certi…cates of deposit
(CDs) and repurchase agreements (repos). Well informed participants in this interbank
market will make out liquidity from solvency problems. This view has consequences also
for the debate about the need of an international LLR. Indeed, Chari and Kehoe (1998)
claim, for example, that such an international LLR is not needed because the joint action
of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan can take care
of any international liquidity problem.
Those developments have led quali…ed observers to dismiss bank panics as a phenomenon
of the past and express con…dence on the e¢ciency of …nancial markets, in particular the
interbank market, to resolve liquidity problems of …nancial intermediaries. This is based
on the view that participants in the interbank market are the most well informed agents
to ascertain the solvency of an institution with liquidity problems.7
6See Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1992).
7For example, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, member of the Executive Committee of the European Cen-
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The main objective of this article is to provide a theoretical foundation for Bagehot’s
doctrine in a model that …ts the modern context of sophisticated and presumably e¢cient
…nancial markets. We are thinking of a short time horizon (say 2 days) that corresponds to
liquidity crises. We shift emphasis from maturity transformation and liquidity insurance
of small depositors to the “modern” form of bank runs where large well-informed investors
refuse to renew their credit (CDs for example) on the interbank market. The decision not
to renew credit may arise as a result on an event (failure of Penn Central, October 1987
crash or LTCM failure) which puts in doubt the repayment capacity of an intermediary or a
number of intermediaries. The Central Bank may then decide to provide liquidity to those
troubled institutions. The question arises about whether such intervention is warranted.
At the same time it is debated whether central banks should disclose the information they
have on potential crisis situations (or the predictions of their internal forecasting models)
and what degree of transparency should a Central Bank’s announcements have.8 We also
hope to shed some light on the issue of transparency and optimal disclosure of information
by the Central Bank.
Since Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banking theory has insisted on the
fragility of banks due to possible coordination failures between depositors (bank runs).
However it is hard to base any policy recommendation on their model, since it systemat-
ically possesses multiple equilibria. Furthermore, a run equilibrium needs to be justi…ed
tral Bank in charge of banking supervision, has gone as far as saying that classical bank runs may occur
only in textbooks, precisely because measures like deposit insurance and capital adequacy requirements
have been put in place. Furthermore, despite recognizing that ”rapid out‡ows of uninsured interbank
liabilities” are less unlikely, Padoa-Schioppa states that ”However, since interbank counterparties are
much better informed than depositors, this event would typically require the market to have a strong sus-
picion that the bank is actually insolvent. If such a suspicion were to be unfounded and not generalised,
the width and depth of today’s interbank market is such that other institutions would probably replace
(possibly with the encouragement of the public authorities as described above) those which withdraw
their funds” (Padoa-Schioppa (1999)).
8See, for example, Tarkka and Mayes (2000).
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with the presence of sunspots that coordinate the behavior of investors. Indeed, otherwise
no one would deposit in a bank that will be subject to run. This view of banking insta-
bility has been disputed by Gorton (1985) and others who argue that crises are related
to fundamentals and not to self-ful…lling panics. In this view, crises are triggered by bad
news about the returns to be obtained by the bank. Gorton (1988) studies panics in the
National Banking Era in the US and concludes that crises were predictable by indicators
of the business cycle.9 There is an ongoing empirical debate about whether crises are
predictable and their relation to fundamentals.10
Our approach is inspired by Postlewaite and Vives (1987), who display an incomplete
information model with a unique Bayesian equilibrium with a positive probability of
bank runs, and the model is adapted from the ”global game” analysis of Carlsson and
Van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998).11 This approach builds a bridge between
the ”panic” and ”fundamentals” view of crises by linking the probability of occurrence of
a crisis to the fundamentals. A crucial property of the model is that, when the private
information of investors is precise enough, the game among them has a unique equilibrium.
Moreover, at this unique equilibrium there is an intermediate interval of values of the
bank’s assets for which, in the absence of intervention by the Central Bank, the bank
is solvent but can fail by the fact that a too large proportion of depositors withdraw
their money. In other words, in this intermediate range for the fundamentals there is the
potential for a coordination failure. Furthermore, the range in which such coordination
failure occurs diminishes with the strength of fundamentals.
Given that this equilibrium is unique and based on the fundamentals of the bank, we are
9The phenomenon has been theorized in the literature on information-based bank runs such as Chari
and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Allen and Gale (1998).
10See also Kaminsky et al (1999) and Radelet and Sachs (1998) for perspectives on international crisis.
11See also Heinemann and Illing (2000) and Corsetti et al (2000).
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able to provide some policy recommendations on how to avoid such failure. More specif-
ically, we discuss the articulation between ex-ante regulation of solvency and liquidity
ratios and ex-post provision of emergency liquidity assistance. It is found that liquid-
ity and solvency regulation can solve the coordination problem but typically the cost is
too high in terms of foregone returns. This means that prudential measures have to be
complemented with emergency discount window loans.
We also introduce a public signal and discuss the optimal disclosure policy of the Central
Bank. Indeed, the Central Bank typically has information about banks that the market
does not have (and, conversely, market participants have also information complementary
to the Central Bank knowledge).12 The model allows for the information structures of the
Central Bank and investors to be non-nested. Our discussion has a bearing on the slippery
issue of the optimal degree of transparency of Central Bank announcements. Indeed, Alan
Greenspan has become famous for his oblique way of saying things, fostering an industry
of ”Greenspanology” or interpretation of his statements. Our model may rationalize
oblique statements by central bankers that seem to add noise to a basic message. Indeed,
we will show that precisely because the Central Bank may be in a unique position to
provide information that becomes common knowledge it has the capacity to destabilize
expectations in the market (which in our context means to move the interbank market to a
regime of multiple equilibria). By fudging the disclosure of information the Central Bank
makes sure that somewhat di¤erent interpretations of the release will be made preventing
destabilization. The potential damaging e¤ects of public information is a theme also
developed in Morris and Shin (2001).
Finally, we endogenize the short-term debt structure as a way to discipline bank managers
12See Peek et al (1999), De Young et al (1998), and Berger et al (1998).
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because of a moral hazard problem. The framework allows us to discuss early closure
policies of banks and the interaction of the LLR, prompt corrective action and orderly
resolution of failures. We can study then the adequacy of Bagehot’s doctrine in a richer
environment.
The rest of the article is organized as follows:
² Section 2 presents the model.
² Section 3 discusses runs and solvency.
² Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium of the game between investors.
² Section 5 studies the properties of this equilibrium and the e¤ect of prudential
regulation on coordination failure.
² Section 6 discusses the LLR policy implications of our model and the relations with
Bagehot’s doctrine.
² Section 7 introduces a public signal and discusses transparency.
² Section 8 sketches how to endogenize the liability structure and its welfare implica-
tions with attention to crisis resolution.
² Concluding remarks end the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a market with three dates: ¿ = 0; 1; 2. At date ¿ = 0 the bank possesses own
funds E, and collects uninsured wholesale deposits (CDs for example) for some amountD0,
normalized to 1. These funds are used in part to …nance some investment I in risky assets
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(loans), the rest being held in cash reserves M . Under normal circumstances, the returns
RI on these assets are collected at date ¿ = 2, the CDs are repaid, and the stockholders
of the bank get the di¤erence (when it is positive). However, early withdrawals may
occur at an interim date ¿ = 1, following the observation of private signals on the future
realization of R. If the proportion x of these withdrawals exceeds the cash reserves M of
the bank, the bank is forced to sell some of its assets. To summarize our notation, the
bank’s balance sheet at ¿ = 0 is represented as follows:
I D0 = 1
M E
where:
² D0 (=1) is the volume of uninsured wholesale deposits, normally repaid at ¿ = 2 but
that can also be withdrawn at ¿ = 1. The nominal value of deposits upon withdrawal
is D ¸ 1 independently of the withdrawal date. So, early withdrawal entails no cost
for the depositors themselves (when the bank is not liquidated prematurely). We
assume that the withdrawal decision is delegated to fund managers who typically
prefer to renew the deposits (i.e. not to withdraw early) but are penalized by the
depositors if the bank fails. Suppose that fund managers obtain a bene…t B > 0 if
they get the money back or if they withdraw and the bank fails. They get nothing
otherwise. However, to withdraw involves a cost C > 0 for the managers (for
example because their reputation su¤ers if they have to recognize that they have
made a bad investment). The net expected bene…t of withdrawing is B¡C > 0 while
the one of not withdrawing is (1 ¡ P )B; where P is the probability that the bank
fails. Accordingly, fund managers adopt the following behavioral rule: withdraw if
and only if they anticipate P > ° = C=B; where ° 2 (0; 1):
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² E represents the value of equity (or more generally long term debt; it may also
include insured deposits13).
² I denotes the volume of investment in risky assets, which have a random return R
at ¿ = 2.
² Finally, M is the amount of cash reserves (money) held by the bank.
At ¿ = 1, each uninsured fund manager i privately observes a signal si = R + "i, where
the "is are i.i.d. and also independent of R: As a result, a proportion x of them decides
to “withdraw” (i.e. not to renew their CDs). By assumption there is no other source of
…nancing for the bank (except maybe the Central Bank, see below) so if x > M
D
, the bank
is forced to sell a volume y of assets:14 if the needed volume of sales y is greater than the
total of available assets I the bank fails at ¿ = 1. If not, the bank continues until date 2.
Failure occurs at ¿ = 2 whenever
R(I ¡ y) < (1¡ x)D: (1)
Our modeling tries to capture in the simplest possible way the main institutional features
of modern interbank markets. In our model, banks essentially …nance themselves by two
complementary sources: equity (or long term debt) and uninsured short term deposits
(or CDs), which are uncollateralized and involve …xed repayments. However, in case of
a liquidity shortage at date 1, banks also have the possibility to sell some of their assets
(or equivalently borrow against collateral) on the repo market. This secondary market
for bank assets is assumed to be informationally e¢cient, in the sense that the secondary
13If they are fully insured, these deposits have no reason to be withdrawn early and can thus be
assimilated to stable resources.
14These sales are typically accompanied with a repurchase agreement or repo. They are thus equivalent
to a collateralized loan.
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price aggregates the decentralized information of investors about the quality of the bank’s
assets.15 Therefore we assume that the resale value of the bank’s assets depends on R.
However bank owners cannot obtain the full value of these assets but only a fraction of
this value 1
1+¸
, with ¸ > 0: Accordingly the volume of sales needed to face withdrawals x
is given by:
y = (1 + ¸)
[xD ¡M ]+
R
where (xD ¡M)+ = max(0; xD ¡M).
The parameter ¸ measures the cost of ”…re sales” in the secondary market for bank assets.
It is crucial for our analysis16, and can be explained by di¤erent types of considerations:
limited commitment of future cash ‡ows (as in Hart and Moore (1994) or Diamond and
Rajan (1997)), moral hazard (as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)) or adverse selection
(as in Flannery (1996)). We have chosen to stress the last explanation, because it gives
a simple justi…cation for the superiority of the Central Bank over …nancial markets in
the provision of liquidity to banks in trouble. Suppose indeed that the risky assets of the
bank consist of a continuum of in…nitesimal loans indexed by j 2 [0; 1] of returns Rvj
where the vjs are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed on the interval [ 11+¸ ;
1+2¸
1+¸
]. Suppose also
that individual investors are all in…nitesimal (so that they can only buy one of the loans)
and cannot observe the vjs (which are privately observed by the bank). Each individual
investor is therefore afraid to get the lowest quality loan, thus the maximum price he is
ready to pay is R
1+¸
. The superiority of the Central Bank resides in its large …nancial
capacity, and thus its ability to eliminate the adverse selection problem by buying the
15We can imagine for instance that the bank organizes an auction among investors for the sale of its
assets. The investors bid optimally given their private signals si. Since we assume that there is a large
number of such depositors and that their signals are independent, the law of large numbers implies that
the equilibrium price p of this auction is a deterministic function of R .
16For a similar assumption in a model of an international lender of last resort, see Goodhart and Huang
(1999b).
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entire portfolio (or a representative sample) at a unit price of R. The parameter ¸ can also
be interpreted as a liquidity premium, i.e. the interest margin that the market requires
for lending on a short notice.17 Therefore our model can be thought as either applying
to the …nancial distress of an individual bank (a bank is close to insolvency when R is
small) or to a generalized banking crisis (a liquidity shortage implying a large ¸).
We do not assume any direct ine¢ciency of interbank markets since operations on these
markets do not involve any physical liquidation of bank assets. However, we will show that
when a bank is close to insolvency (R small) or when there is a liquidity shortage (¸ large)
the interbank markets do not su¢ce to prevent early closure of the bank. Early closure
involves the physical liquidation of assets and this is costly. We model this liquidation
cost (not to be confused with the …re sales premium ¸) as proportional to the future
returns on the bank’s portfolio. In other words, if the bank is liquidated at ¿ = 1, the
(per unit) liquidation value of its assets is ºR, with º ¿ 1
1+¸
.18
3 Runs and solvency
We focus in this section on some features of banks’ liquidity crises that cannot be properly
taken into account within the classical Bryant-Diamond-Dybvig (BDD) framework. In
doing so we take the banks’ liability structure (and in particular the fact that an important
fraction of these liabilities can be withdrawn on demand) as exogenous. A possible way
to endogenize the bank’s liability structure is to introduce a disciplining role for liquid
deposits. In Section 8 we explore such an extension.
17See Allen and Gale (1998) for a model where costly liquidation (asset sales) arises due to the presence
of liquidity constrained speculators in the resale market.
18We could carry out our analysis assuming a physical liquidation cost at ¿ = 1; identifying º and 11+¸ :
However, this simpli…cation will come at the cost of not modelling properly the interbank market.
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We adopt explicitly the short time horizon (say 2 days) that corresponds to liquidity
crises. This means that we shift the emphasis from maturity transformation and liquidity
insurance of small depositors to the “modern” form of bank runs, i.e. large investors
refusing to renew their CDs on the interbank market.
A second element that di¤erentiates our model from BDD is that our bank is not a
mutual bank, but a corporation that acts in the best interest of its stockholders. This
allows us to discuss the role of equity and the articulation between solvency requirements
and provision of emergency liquidity assistance. However a proper modeling of the role
of equityholders remains to be done.
As a consequence of these assumptions, the relation between x, the proportion of early
withdrawals, and the failure of the bank is di¤erent from that in BDD. To see this, let us
recapitulate the di¤erent cases:
² xD  M : there is no liquidation at ¿ = 1. In this case there is failure at ¿ = 2 if
and only if
RI +M < D , R < Rs = D ¡M
I
= 1¡ 1 + E ¡D
I
:
Rs can be interpreted as the solvency threshold of the bank. It is a decreasing
function of the solvency ratio E
I
.
² M < xD  M + RI
1+¸
: there is partial liquidation at ¿ = 1. Failure occurs at ¿ = 2
if and only if
RI ¡ (1 + ¸)(xD ¡M) < (1¡ x)D , R < Rs + ¸xD ¡M
I
= Rs

1 + ¸
xD ¡M
D ¡M
¸
:
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This formula illustrates how, because of the premium ¸ , solvent banks can fail when the
proportion x of early withdrawals is too big19. Notice however an important di¤erence
with BDD: when the bank is ”supersolvent” (R > (1 + ¸)Rs) it can never fail, even if
everybody withdraws (x = 1).
² Finally, when xD > M + RI
1+¸
, the bank is closed at ¿ = 1 (early closure). This
The failure thresholds are summarized in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1
Several comments are in order:
² In our model, early closure is never ex post e¢cient because to physically liquidate
assets is costly. However, as discussed in Section 8, early closure may be ex ante
e¢cient to discipline bank managers and induce them to exert e¤ort.
² The perfect information benchmark of our model (where R is common knowledge at
¿ = 1) has di¤erent properties than in BDD: the multiplicity of equilibria only arises
in the median range Rs  R  (1 + ¸)Rs. When Rs > R everybody runs (x = 1),
when R > (1 + ¸)Rs nobody runs (x = 0) and only in the intermediate region both
equilibria coexist.20 As we will see, and following the ideas introduced by Carlsson
and Van Damme (1993), this pattern is crucial for being able to selecting a unique
equilibrium through the introduction of private noisy signals (when noise is not too
19Note that we can interpret that to obtain resources xD ¡ M > 0 we need to liquidate a fraction of
the portfolio ¹ = xD¡MRI (1 + ¸) and therefore at ¿ = 2 we have left R(1 ¡ ¹)I = RI ¡ (1 + ¸)(xD ¡ M):
20When Rs > R fund managers get B ¡ C > 0 by withdrawing and nothing by waiting. When
R > (1+ ¸)Rsfund managers by withdrawing get B ¡C and by waiting B. Note that if depositors made
directly the investment decisions the equilibria would be the same provided that there is a small cost of
withdrawal.
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important, as in Morris and Shin (1998)). Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) adapt the
same methodology to the BDD model, in which the perfect information game always
has two equilibria, even for very large R. Accordingly, they have to make an extra
assumption, namely that ”there exists an external lender who would be willing to
buy any amount of the investment... if she knew for sure that the long-run return
was excessively high” (Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), p.11), in order to obtain a
unique equilibrium in the presence of private signals with small noise.21
The di¤erent regimes of the bank, as a function of R and x are represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2
The critical value of R below which the bank is closed early is given by:
Rec(x) = (1 + ¸)
(xD ¡M)+
I
:
The critical value of R below which the bank fails is given by:
Rc(x) = Rs + ¸
(xD ¡M)+
I
: (2)
Given that D0 is normalized to one, the parameters Rs;M and I are not independent.
Since we want to study the impact of prudential regulation on the need for Central Bank
intervention, we will focus on Rs (a decreasing function of the solvency ratio E=I ) and
m = M
D
(the liquidity ratio). Replacing I by its value D¡M
Rs
; we obtain:
Rec(x) = Rs(1 + ¸)
(x¡m)+
1¡m ; and
21See also Morris and Shin (2000).
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Rc(x) = Rs(1 + ¸
(x¡m)+
1¡m ):
4 Equilibrium of the investors’ game
In order to simplify the presentation, we concentrate on “threshold” strategies, in which
each fund manager decides to withdraw if and only if his signal is below some threshold
t.22 As we will see later this is without loss of generality. For a given R, a fund manager
withdraws with probability
Pr[R + " < t] = G(t¡R);
where G is the c.d.f. of the random variable ". Given our assumptions, this probability
also equals the proportion of withdrawals x(R; t).
A fund manager withdraws if and only if the probability of failure of the bank (conditional
on the signal s received by the manager and the threshold t used by other managers) is
large enough. That is, P (s; t) > ° , where
P (s; t) = Pr[failurejs; t]
= Pr[R < Rc(x(R; t))js]:
Before we analyze the equilibrium of the investor’s game let us look at the region of
the plane (t; R) where failure occurs. For this, transform Figure 2 by replacing x by
x(R; t) = G(t¡R).
We obtain the Figure 3 below
22It is assumed that the decision on whether to witdraw is taken before the secondary market is
organized and fund managers have the opportunity to learn about R from the secondary price. (On this
issue see Atkeson’s comments on Morris and Shin (2000).)
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Figure 3
Notice that RF (t), the critical R that triggers failure is equal to the solvency threshold
Rs when t is low and fund managers are con…dent about the strength of fundamentals:
RF (t) = Rs if t  t0 = Rs +G¡1(m):
However, for t > t0, RF (t) is an increasing function of t and is de…ned implicitly by
R = Rs(1 + ¸[
G(t¡R)¡m
1¡m ]):
Let us denote by G(:js) the c.d.f. of R conditional on signal s :
G(rjs) = Pr[R < rjs]:
Then given the de…nition of RF (t)
P (s; t) = Pr[R < RF (t)js] = G(RF (t)js) (3)
It is natural to assume thatG(rjs) is decreasing in s: the higher s, the lower the probability
that R lies below any given threshold r. Then it is immediate that P is decreasing in s
and nondecreasing in t: @P
@s
< 0 and @P
@t
¸ 0: This means that the depositors’ game is one
of strategic complementarities. Indeed, given that other fund managers use the strategy
with threshold t the best response of a manager is to use a strategy with threshold s :
withdraw if and only if P (s; t) > ° or equivalently if and only if s < s where P (s; t) = °:
Let s = S(t): Now we have that S 0 = ¡ @P=@t
@P=@s
¸ 0; a higher threshold t by others induce
a manager to use also a higher threshold.
The strategic complementarity property holds for general strategies. Let us also note
that equilibria will be necessarily symmetric. Indeed, in equilibrium every fund manager
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confronts the same situation and has the same payo¤ function and structure of signals.
For a fund manager all that matters is the conditional probability of failure for a given
signal and this depends only on the aggregate withdrawals. Recall that the di¤erential
payo¤ to a fund manager for withdrawing over not withdrawing is given by PB¡C where
C=B = °: A strategy for a fund manager is a function a(s) 2 fnot withdraw, withdrawg :
If more managers withdraw then the probability of failure conditional on receiving signal
s increases. This just means that the payo¤ to a fund manager displays increasing dif-
ferences with respect to the actions of others.23 The depositor’s game is a supermodular
game and there will exist a largest and a smallest equilibrium. At the largest equilibrium
every fund manager withdraws in the largest number of occasions, at the smallest equi-
librium every fund manager withdraws in the smallest number of occasions. The largest
(smallest) equilibrium can be identi…ed then with the highest (lowest) threshold strategy
t(t): These extremal equilibria bound the set of rationalizable outcomes. That is, strate-
gies outside this set can be eliminated by iterated deletion of dominated strategies.24 We
will make assumptions so that t = t and equilibrium will be unique.
The threshold t = t¤ corresponds to a (symmetric) Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only
if P (t¤; t¤) = °. Indeed, suppose that funds managers use the threshold strategy t¤. Then
for s = t¤; P = ° and since P is decreasing in s for s < t¤ we have that P (s; t¤) > ° and
the manager withdraws. Conversely, if t¤ is a (symmetric) equilibrium then for s = t¤
there is no withdrawal and therefore P (t¤; t¤)  °: If P (t¤; t¤) < ° then by continuity
for s close but less than t¤ we would have P (s; t¤) < ° , a contradiction. It is clear then
that the largest and the smallest solutions to P (t¤; t¤) = ° correspond respectively to the
23See Chapter 2 in Vives (1999) for an exposition of the theory of supermodular games.
24See Morris and Shin (1998) for an explicit demonstration of the outcome of iterative elimination of
dominated strategies in a similar model.
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largest and smallest equilibrium.
An equilibrium can also be characterized by a couple of equations in two unknowns (a
withdrawal threshold t¤and a failure threshold R¤):
G(R¤jt¤) = °; and (4)
R¤ = Rs(1 + ¸[
G(t¤ ¡R¤)¡m
1¡m ]+): (5)
Equation (4) states that conditionally on observing a signal s = t¤, the probability that
R < R¤ is °: Equation (5) states that, given a withdrawal threshold t¤, R¤ is the critical
return (i.e. the one below which failure occurs). Equation (5) implies that R¤ belongs
to [Rs;(1 + ¸)Rs]:Notice that early closure occurs whenever D:x(t¤; R) > M + IR1+¸ ;where
x(t¤; R) = G(t¤ ¡ R¤). This happens if and only if R is smaller than some threshold
Rec(t
¤): Clearly, Rec(t¤) is always smaller than the failure threshold R¤ since early closure
implies failure, while the converse is not true (see Figure 2).
In order to simplify the analysis of this system we are going to make distributional as-
sumptions on returns and signals. More speci…cally, we will assume that the distributions
of R and ² are normal, with respective means R and 0, and respective precisions (i.e.
inverse variances) ® and ¯. Denoting by © the c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution
the equilibrium is characterized then by a pair ( t¤, R¤) such that:
©
µp
®+ ¯R¤ ¡ ®
¹R + ¯t¤p
®+ ¯
¶
= °; (6)
and
R¤ = Rs
µ
1 + ¸

©(
p
¯(t¤ ¡R¤))¡m
1¡m
¸
+
¶
: (7)
We now can now state our …rst result
18
Proposition 1 When ¯ (the precision of the private signal of investors) is large enough
relative to ® (prior precision), there is a unique t¤ such that P (t¤; t¤) = °: We conclude
that the investor’s game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium. In equilibrium, fund man-
agers use a strategy with threshold t¤.
Proof of Proposition 1: We show that '(s) def= P (s; s) is decreasing for
¯ ¸ ¯0 def= 12¼
¡
¸®
I
¢2 with I = D¡M
Rs
: Under our assumptions R conditional on signal
realization s follows a normal distribution N(®
¹R+¯s
®+¯
; 1
®+¯
): Denoting by © the c.d.f. of a
standard normal distribution, it follows that
'(s) = P (s; s) = Pr[R < RF (s)js]
= ©
p
®+ ¯RF (s)¡ ®
¹R + ¯sp
®+ ¯
¸
: (8)
This function is clearly decreasing for s < t0 since, in this region, we have RF (s) ´ Rs.
Now if s > t0, RF (s) is increasing and its inverse is
tF (R) = R +
1p
¯
©¡1
µ
I
¸
(R ¡Rs) +m
¶
:
The derivative of tF is
t0F (R) = 1 +
1p
¯
I
¸

©0
µ
©¡1
µ
I
¸
(R ¡Rs) +m
¶¶¸¡1
:
Since ©0 is bounded above by 1p
2¼
, t0F is bounded below:
t0F (R) ¸ 1 +
r
2¼
¯
I
¸
:
Thus
R0F (s) 

1 +
r
2¼
¯
I
¸
¸¡1
:
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Given formula (8), '(s) will be decreasing provided that
p
®+ ¯
µ
1 +
r
2¼
¯
I
¸
¶¡1
 ¯p
®+ ¯
;
which, after simpli…cation, gives: ¯ ¸ 1
2¼
¡
¸®
I
¢2
: If this condition is satis…ed, there is
at most one equilibrium. Existence is easily shown. When s is small RF (s) = Rs and
equation (6) implies that lims!¡1 '(s) = 1. On the other hand, when s ! +1; RF (s) !
(1 + ¸)Rs and '(s) ! 0:
The limit equilibrium when ¯ tends to in…nity is easily characterized. From equation
(6) we have that lim¯!+1
p
¯(R¤ ¡ t¤) = ©¡1(°): Given that © f¡zg = 1 ¡ © fzg we
obtain that in the limit t¤ = R¤ = Rs(1 + ¸1¡m [max f1¡ ° ¡m; 0g]). The critical cuto¤
R¤ is decreasing with ° and ranges from Rs for ° ¸ 1¡m to (1 + ¸)Rs for ° = 0: It is
also nonincreasing in m: As we establish in the next section, these features of the limit
equilibrium are also valid for ¯ ¸ ¯0:
It is worth noting also that with a di¤use prior, ® = 0, the equilibrium is unique for any
private precision of investors (indeed, we have that ¯0 = 0):
5 Coordination failure and prudential regulation
For ¯ large enough, we have just seen that there exists a unique equilibrium whereby
investors adopt a threshold t¤ characterized by
©
µp
®+ ¯RF (t
¤)¡ ®
¹R + ¯t¤p
® + ¯
¶
= °;
or
RF (t
¤) =
1p
® + ¯
µ
©¡1(°) +
® ¹R+ ¯t¤p
®+ ¯
¶
: (9)
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For this equilibrium threshold, the failure of the bank will occur if and only if:
R < RF (t
¤) = R¤:
This means that the bank fails if and only if fundamentals are weak, R < R¤: When
R¤ > Rs we have an intermediate interval of fundamentals R 2 [Rs; R¤) where there
is coordination failure: the bank is solvent but illiquid. The occurrence of coordination
failure can be controlled by the level of the liquidity ratio m as the following proposition
shows.
Proposition 2 There is a critical liquidity ratio of the bank m such that for m ¸ m we
have that R¤ = Rs; which means that only insolvent banks fail (there is no coordination
failure. Conversely, for m < m we have that R¤ > Rs: This means that for R 2 [Rs; R¤)
the bank is solvent but illiquid (there is coordination failure).
Proof of Proposition 2: For t¤  t0 = Rs + 1p¯©¡1(m), the equilibrium occurs for
R¤ = Rs. By replacing in formula (6) this gives:
(® + ¯)Rs 
p
®+ ¯©¡1(°) + ® ¹R + ¯Rs +
p
¯©¡1(m);
which is equivalent to:
©¡1(m) ¸ ®p
¯
(Rs ¡ ¹R)¡
r
1 +
®
¯
©¡1(°): (10)
Therefore, the coordination failure disappears when m ¸ m; where
m = ©
µ
®p
¯
(Rs ¡ ¹R)¡
r
1 +
®
¯
©¡1(°)
¶
:
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Notice that, since Rs is a decreasing function of EI , the critical liquidity ratio m decreases
when the solvency ratio E
I
increases.25
The equilibrium threshold return R¤ is determined (when (8) is not satis…ed) by the
solution to:
Á(R) = ®(R¡ ¹R)¡
p
¯©¡1
µ
1¡m
¸Rs
(R¡Rs) +m
¶
¡
p
®+ ¯©¡1(°) = 0: (11)
When ¯ ¸ ¯0, Á0(R) < 0 and the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium
threshold R¤ are straightforward. Indeed, we have that @Á=@m < 0; @Á=@Rs > 0;
@Á=@¸ > 0; @Á=@° < 0 and @Á=@R < 0: The following proposition states the results.
Proposition 3 Comparative statics of R¤(and thus of the probability of failure):
² R¤ is a decreasing function of the liquidity ratio m and the solvency Rs of the bank,
of the critical withdrawal probability ° and of the expected return on the bank’s assets
¹R.
² R¤ is an increasing function of the …re sales premium ¸:
We have thus that stronger fundamentals, as indicated by a higher prior mean ¹R also
imply a lower likelihood of failure. In contrast, a higher …re sales premium ¸ increases
the incidence of failure. Indeed, for a higher ¸ a larger portion of the portfolio must be
liquidated to meet the requirements of withdrawals. We have also that R¤ is decreasing
with the critical withdrawal probability ° and as ° ! 0; R¤ ! (1 + ¸)Rs:
The e¤ect of an increase in the precision of the prior ® is potentially ambiguous. This is
so because @Á=@® = R¡ ¹R¡ ©¡1(°)
2
p
®+¯
, whose sign depends on whether R¤ S ¹R and ° S 1=2
25More generally, it is easy to see that in our model, the regulator can control the probabilities of
illiquidity (Pr(R < R¤)) and insolvency (Pr(R < Rs)) of the bank by imposing minimum liquidity and
solvency ratios.
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(recall that ©¡1(°) S 0 as ° S 1=2): We should expect that the cost of withdrawal
C is small in relation to the continuation bene…t for the fund managers B: Therefore,
we can always assume that ° = C=B will be less than 1=2: This means that when the
fundamentals are bad ( ¹R low) we will have R¤ > ¹R and @Á=@® > 0: In consequence
increasing ® will increase R¤: Indeed, to have more precise prior information about a bad
outcome worsens the coordination problem. When the fundamentals are good ( ¹R high)
and R¤ < ¹R the outcome is ambiguous unless R¤ << ¹R, in which case @Á=@® < 0. Then
a more precise prior information about a very good outcome alleviates the coordination
problem.
A similar analysis applies to changes in the precision of private information of investors ¯.
The reason is that the sign of f@Á=@¯g depends on the sign of©¡1
³
1¡m
¸Rs
(R ¡Rs) +m
´
and
of ©¡1(°) and we may have 1¡m
¸Rs
(R ¡ Rs) +m S 1=2 and/or ° S 1=2: For example, for
¯ large enough it can be seen that sign f@Á=@¯g = sign ©¡1(°): Then an improved
precision of private signals decreases (increases) R¤ and the failure rate, if the relative
cost of withdrawal for the fund managers is small, ° < 1=2 (large, ° > 1=2): If we think
as before that the reasonable case is to have ° < 1=2 then an improvement in the private
precision of investors (when it is already high) makes failure less likely.26
6 Coordination failure and LLR Policy
The main contribution of our paper has been to show the theoretical possibility of a
solvent bank being illiquid, due to a coordination failure on the interbank market. We
are now going to explore the lender of last resort policy of the central bank and present
a scenario where it is possible to give a theoretical justi…cation to Bagehot’s doctrine.
26For ¯ large we have that sign f@Á=@¯g = sign
n
©¡1(°)
2
( 1p
¯
¡ 1p
®+¯
)
o
= sign ©¡1(°):
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